New Mexico is one of them; Tesla sells them on a Native American reservation. I guess the idea is that the purchaser has someone to complain to. I think most insurance businesses have a similar restriction.
EDIT: never mind, I figured it out… 
I’m sorry, but some states require local dealerships what???
I have zero idea what you are talking about, to me you have left out some information (incomplete thoughts)…
I even asked my wife (smarter than me) and she said it doesn’t make sense to her either… 
This all became news several years ago when Tesla first proposed direct to consumer sales. Many states have laws protecting car dealerships and do not allow direct to consumer sales of automobiles. Some have changed their policies and in others, there are loopholes. Tesla has been trying to break the iron grip the special interests have on this arrangement.
IMO it’s protection for the franchise dealerships. We have a similar situation in MD. As you may remember one organization is allowed to own one liquor store. Even though Total Wine and More effectively has two, they had to come up with an unusual way to make it work. Total Wine is owned by two brothers. One is a part owner of the Laurel store and the other is part owner of the Towson store. The latter is named Beltway Liquors. The similarity is that a commercial lobby has created barriers to prevent someone from infringing on their business model.
Tesla has a store front near me in Owings Mills. I bought my car in their showroom and picked it up there. They have a service shop, but they prefer to work in your driveway if they think they can do it there. I had them service my windshield washers recently. It wasn’t spraying well. It turned out that the fluid tubing was stretched too tight causing a restricted passage. The tech loosened up the tubing and it now works fine. I also had them rotate the tires. It’s a good thing I did. The tech said that EVs need an aluminum hydraulic jack to ensure that touching the wheels won’t cause electrocution. This seemed odd, but I didn’t press it. Also, the lift point is below the rear door and on the battery. The entire side is lifted and the front and back tires are exchanged without moving the jack. I’ll check my jack and see if it is acceptable for the next time I rotate in a couple of years. Since I’ll be 74 or 75, I might pay them $65 to do it again.
Am I the only one who remembers Daewoo’s unique approach to car sales in The US? Ultimately, their strategy was a failure, and here is a capsulized description:
Daewoo planned on operating mostly factory-owned dealerships, to save on distribution costs and realize lower costs for consumers. This setup was common in Korea, and had also been used by Daewoo with some success in Great Britain (where it had operated since 1995). However, many US states forbade manufacturers from selling directly to customers, or allowed it only with certain restrictions. Daewoo initially planned to concentrate on those states last, and to use franchised dealers only where required by law. Unfortunately, this strategy became at odds with Daewoo’s burning need for a quick expansion, and was quickly abandoned in favor of traditional dealerships.
Aside from factory dealerships, Daewoo also considered some other unusual tactics, but most were never put into practice – again because of the growing urgency of just making sales. For example, the company explored the possibility of direct Internet sales, which would certainly have been eye-opening in the 1990s. They also considered leasing space in retail stores such as Kmart or Walmart for sales operations, and partnering with national repair chains such as Pep Boys or Penske Auto Centers for service (Penske did partner with Daewoo briefly). Daewoo’s initial plan envisioned an unconventional dealership experience, with no-haggle pricing, and sales staff who handled both the financing and sales aspects of each transaction. But in the rush to open a huge number of dealerships in a short timeframe, those goals were abandoned. Daewoo dealers ended up being rather conventional affairs.
However, the most unusual aspect of Daewoo’s early US marketing strategy was on whom it focused: College students… as promoters, sales personnel and customers. What could possibly go wrong? Plenty, obviously, and this plan’s details sounded like a sophomore-year term paper rather than a strategy by one of the world’s largest companies to sell durable goods in the world’s largest consumer market.
The idea went like this: Daewoo hired students as “campus advisors,” who, provided with loaner cars, were to promote those cars to their fellow students, friends and family. As independent contractors, campus advisors were remunerated in two ways: by commissions of up to $500 on each sale, and by generous discounts on their own purchase of a new Daewoo. These students didn’t actually conduct the sales transaction – rather they promoted Daewoo cars, and directed customers to nearby dealerships, where financial components of each sale (and the actual delivery) would take place, overseen by a small core of professional sales staff.
Why on earth would Daewoo do this? To stand out in the crowd – affordably. Kim Woo-choong explained the rationale shortly before sales began: “We cannot compete with other manufacturers who are selling big units, with bigger advertising and promotion budgets. It is better to go for some special segment.” The reasoning here was that college students were more likely than the general population to be early adopters and buy a little-known foreign car brand… therefore, marketing to this “special segment” would (hopefully) create enthusiasm among a demographic group known for being originators of many trends. Daewoo eventually hired several thousand campus advisors nationwide.
There were, of course, more than a few flaws in this logic. For example, Daewoo paid to fly each advisor to Seoul for training and factory tours, but after those students graduated, all of that training would be lost. Also, aside from the commission, this business model did little to reward the dedication needed to promote a new consumer brand (advisors were expected to work 8-10 hours per week doing things like handing out flyers and hosting test-drive events, but there was little accountability). Many campus advisors undoubtedly used the position as a resume-booster, and an opportunity to get a free loaner car for a few months. Lastly, the concept of peer-marketing may work for small-ticket items, but few students would soak up a classmate’s sales spiel enough to actually buy a $12,000 car.
If you want to read the entire history of this failed marketing strategy, here it is, but it’s fairly long:
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